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FREEDOM OF MARRIAGE: AN ANALYSIS OF 
POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE RIGHTS 
RACHEL ALYCE WASHBURN

 
ABSTRACT 
The institution of marriage is deeply embedded in modern society. 
Within the United States, legal recognition of marriage conveys both 
social dignity and material benefits to married individuals. As far back as 
1967, the Supreme Court has treated freedom of marriage as a 
Constitutional right necessary to protect personhood rights such as liberty 
and autonomy. However, it did not fully extend this right to same-sex 
couples until its 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges.  
Justice Scalia criticizes the majority opinion in Obergefell as lacking 
logic and precision, yet it reconciles jurisprudential discrepancies in prior 
case law addressing the right of marriage. These discrepancies are rooted 
in the contrasting negative and positive rights analytics of Immanuel Kant 
and Georg Willhelm Friedrich Hegel, respectively. Supreme Court 
precedent instituted a negative right to marriage in Loving v. Virginia, 
and a positive right to marriage in United States v. Windsor. These 
decisions are inconsistent under an exclusive negative or positive rights 
analysis. However, the Obergefell decision establishes Constitutional 
protection of same-sex marriage by acknowledging correlating positive 
and negative rights to marriage. This Note analyzes same-sex marriage 
under negative, positive, and correlating rights analytics. It concludes that 
the correlating rights analysis in Obergefell achieves optimal freedom by 
respecting and protecting the personhood rights of same-sex couples.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Marriage has been a cornerstone of societal structures around the world 
for many centuries.
1
 It is a timeless institution that remains a centerpiece 
of twenty-first century society in the United States. While marriage is an 
age-old practice, the institution has evolved as the needs of society have 
shifted.
2
 Views regarding the acceptability of couples of different religion, 
race, and now gender have changed.
3
 Despite this evolution, the concept of 
marriage has consistently been valued by society and the legal system. 
People marry for a variety of reasons: religious, institutional, social, 
individualist, and sexual.
4
 There cannot be one exclusive definition of 
marriage because every marriage differs based on the needs of each 
couple. 
Although there are many types of intimate personal relationships, for 
the purposes of this Note the term “marriage” refers to the creation of a 
spousal relationship that is recognized within the legal system. The scope 
of this paper is limited to jurisprudential analysis of which marriages 
ought to be recognized within the legal system. Until recently, individual 
states had the ability to determine their own legal definitions of marriage.
5
 
Legal recognition of marriage gives couples unique benefits within the 
law, the economy, and society. Therefore, when a legal system denies 
marital status to particular groups of people, they are denied these benefits 
and the ability to fully partake in the society in which they live. In 
Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court extended the right of marriage to 
same-sex couples based in part on precedent establishing that, “the right to 
personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual 
 
 
 1. See Joel Nichols, Misunderstanding Marriage and Missing Religion, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 
195, 198 (2011). 
 2. See id. at 197–201 (providing a short history of marriage in Western culture, beginning in the 
Middle Ages). 
 3. See, e.g., Don S. Browning, Modern Law and Christian Jurisprudence on Marriage and 
Family, 58 EMORY L.J. 31, 48–49 (2008) (an overview of the recent effect of Christianity on the 
marital institution); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Under our Constitution, the 
freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be 
infringed by the State.”). 
 4. See Paul R. Amato, Institutional, Companionate, and Individualistic Marriages: Change 
over Time and Implications for Marital Quality, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS: LAW, POLICY, 
AND THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY FAMILIES 107, 111 (Marsha Garrison & 
Elizabeth S. Scott eds., 2012) (containing a study of different types of marriages and how they change 
over time). 
 5. See Nichols, supra note 1, at 195. 
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autonomy.”6 While Supreme Court precedent has treated marriage as a 
personhood right,
7
 it has also historically confirmed the power of each 
state to determine who could marry.
8
 These discrepancies in Supreme 
Court precedent are rooted in contradictory jurisprudence, which 
Obergefell resolves without specifically addressing.  
The first part of this Note examines contradictory treatment of marriage 
in Supreme Court precedent prior to its recent decision in Obergefell. A 
combination of that precedent resulted in a legal system that allowed states 
to determine which relationships grant legally protected rights to 
personhood, dignity, and liberty.
9
 In the second part I briefly discuss why 
states have a legitimate interest in the marital institution. I subsequently 
analyze state regulation of marriage and explain why the government does 
not have a legitimate interest in denying same-sex couples access to the 
marital institution. Part III explains the negative and positive rights 
theories of Kant and Hegel, respectively, and how these theories apply to 
marriage. Finally, in Part IV, I argue that a comprehensive evaluation of 
freedom requires acknowledging that positive and negative rights 
correlate. In order for the government to maximize freedom, it must 
balance a duty to limit constraints on personal rights against the task of 
regulating social institutions that affect legitimate government interests. In 
conclusion, a comprehensive analysis of both negative and positive 
freedom shows that the government has a duty to limit constraints on the 
personal right to marry. While there is no legitimate state interest 
outweighing this duty, there is a state incentive to not limit access to social 
institutions. This conclusion is consistent with the holding in Obergefell, 
and strengthens the position that the government ought to protect the 
personhood right of marriage by prohibiting states from denying same-sex 
couples the freedom to marry.  
 
 
 6. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2589 (2015) (“This abiding connection between 
marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under the Due Process 
Clause.”). 
 7. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the 
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”); see also id. 
(“Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”) 
(quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). 
 8. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013). 
 9. Id. at 2696. 
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I. RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGE IN THE LAW 
The legal system historically recognized and regulated marriage 
through individual state laws.
10
 In Windsor, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that “[t]he freedom to marry has long been recognized as 
one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness 
by free men.”11 However, Windsor maintained a legal system where states 
define and regulate marriage, despite precedent in Loving that established 
the personal right to marry as protected by the Constitution.
12
 Prior to 
Obergefell, it was unclear to whom and how far the Supreme Court would 
extend this right. In 1967, the Supreme Court guaranteed that “the freedom 
to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual 
and cannot be infringed by the State.”13 Forty-eight years later the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that same-sex couples should have the same 
freedom to marry, and that the federal government must provide equal 
protection of that freedom from state infringement.
14
 This position is 
inconsistent with Windsor, where the Supreme Court accepted a legal 
policy allowing states the power to decide who has the freedom to 
marry—decide whose relationships are “worthy of dignity in the 
community.”15 
Although Windsor held the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
16
 to be 
an unconstitutional deprivation of the due process of law under the Fifth 
Amendment, it stipulated that only same-sex marriages deemed lawful by 
the states were protected.
17
 The Court declined to answer the primary 
question of whether the right to marry is an inherently protected right 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because 
the majority limited their holding to the more narrow issue of DOMA 
 
 
 10. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689–90 (“By history and tradition the definition and regulation of 
marriage . . . has been treated as being within the authority and realm of the separate States.”). 
 11. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. 
 12. See id. (referring to marriage as “one of the basic civil rights of man.”). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“[T]he right to marry is a 
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and 
that liberty.”). 
 15. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692; see also Obergefell, 135 U.S. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(arguing that Windsor stands for the proposition that the Framers “entrusted the States with the whole 
subject of domestic relations of husband and wife.”). 
 16. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682 (explaining that DOMA is a federal law “which excludes a 
same-sex partner from the definition of ‘spouse’ as that term is used in federal statutes.”). 
 17. Id. at 2695–96 (specifying protection for marriages made lawful by the state and limiting its 
holding to those lawful marriages). 
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under the Fifth Amendment.
18
 The Windsor Court did not find DOMA 
unconstitutional because it violated a constitutionally protected freedom of 
marriage, but because it undermined the states’ ability to define and 
regulate marriage.
19
 Furthermore, the Court emphasized the power of the 
state to determine which relationships are deserving of recognition and 
protection of personhood and dignity within a community.
20
 The Loving 
Court held “that [states] restricting the freedom to marry solely because of 
racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause.”21 The negative inference of the Windsor Court’s holding is that 
states have the power to restrict who may marry and determine whose 
relationships deserve protection of personhood and dignity. The Court 
reasoned that the state historically had this power and should continue 
having it so that it can protect its interest in domestic relations within the 
state.
22
 
Some state and circuit courts took the position that state involvement in 
marriage originated, and is necessary, to enable the state to regulate the 
effects of procreation. For example, in DeBoer v. Snyder, the Sixth Circuit 
expressed the belief that “[o]ne starts from the premise that governments 
got into the business of defining marriage, and remain in the business of 
defining marriage, not to regulate love but to regulate sex, most especially 
the intended and unintended effects of male-female intercourse.”23 The 
DeBoer court clarified that while marriage is now understood to 
encompass more than a couple’s procreative capacities, the legal definition 
of who may marry ought to be determined by individual states, and not 
treated as a Constitutional right.
24
 It went on to explain that a same-sex 
 
 
 18. Id. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The opinion does not resolve and indeed does not even 
mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under the Equal Protection 
Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for more than mere 
rationality.”). 
 19. See id. at 2696 (majority opinion) (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage 
laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”). 
 20. See id. at 2692 (“When the State used its historic and essential authority to define the marital 
relation in this way, its role and its power in making the decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, 
and protection of the class in their own community.”). 
 21. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
 22. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (“The definition of marriage is the foundation of the State’s 
broader authority to regulate the subject of domestic relations with respect to the ‘[p]rotection of 
offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibilities.’”) (quoting Williams v. 
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942)). 
 23. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 24. Id. at 402–03 (“Not one of the plaintiffs’ theories, however, makes the case for 
constitutionalizing the definition of marriage and for removing the issue from the place it has been 
since the founding: in the hands of state voters.”). 
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couple’s ability to raise children is a legitimate reason for some states to 
broaden their definition of marriage; yet it does not convey a 
Constitutional right to marriage. This decision was consistent with 
language in Windsor, which emphasized each state’s individual ability to 
define and regulate marriage. 
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court specifically held that same-sex 
couples have the same Constitutional protection of the right to marry 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
25
 This holding embraced a jurisprudential view consistent 
with the forty-eight year old Loving decision, as opposed to the recent 
decision in Windsor. In doing so it overturned DeBoer v. Snyder, and 
clarified that the federal government has an affirmative duty to protect 
same-sex couples from state action which infringes on rights derived 
through personhood and ensured by the Constitutional guarantee of 
liberty.
26
 In protecting a same-sex couples’ right to marriage, Obergefell 
resolved a discrepancy between the decisions in Loving and Windsor. The 
jurisprudence underlying this decision is not made evident in the opinion, 
yet understanding it strengthens the holding against Justice Scalia’s 
critique that it lacks the logic and precision demanded in the law.
27
  
II. THE STATE’S INTEREST IN MARRIAGE 
In Windsor, the Supreme Court explained that the state has an interest 
in defining marriage as a way to regulate its interests regarding children, 
property, and marital responsibilities.
28
 It was traditionally believed that 
“marriage is the foundation of the family and of society, without which 
there would be neither civilization nor progress.”29 Although marriage has 
increasingly been viewed more as an individual right,
30
 the state still 
claims an interest in regulating it.
31
 As long as society continues to be 
structured around the institution of marriage, that institution will continue 
 
 
 25. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015).  
 26. Id. at 2594. 
 27. See id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The world does not expect logic and precision in 
poetry or inspirational pop-philosophy; it demands them in the law. The stuff contained in today’s 
opinion has to diminish this Court’s reputation for clear thinking and sober analysis.”). 
 28. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013). 
 29. Maggie Gallagher, Rites, Rights, and Social Institutions: Why and How Should the Law 
Support Marriage?, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 225, 225 (2004) (citing Maynard v. 
Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)). 
 30. Id. at 227. 
 31. This Note does not address the argument that all serious relationships affect state interests, 
and so marriage is not unique and should be outside of state control. However, that argument just as 
easily leads to the conclusion that the state has an interest in regulating all serious relationship. 
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to have a significant impact on societal and state interests. Even if the state 
did not regulate marriage, it is a deeply embedded societal custom in 
which people want to take part. 
Regardless of who or why people marry, the outcome has a substantial 
effect on state interests. When people combine property it affects 
ownership and any future ability to divide it.
32
 Married couples typically 
divide responsibilities and contribute to the family through different roles; 
historically through the spousal division where men earned income while 
women performed domestic work.
33
 Although contribution to the family is 
not as gender divided as it once was, the government still has an interest in 
ensuring that partners receive proportionate shares of the proceeds of that 
partnership in divorce. The government also has an interest in accounting 
for factors such as combined incomes, shared responsibility for supporting 
children, and inheritance proceeds so that it can best meet societal needs 
and prevent abuse of the tax system. While the state should be limited in 
defining marriage and delegating who has the right to marry, the state 
remains invested in prohibiting marriage between parties incapable of 
giving consent in order to prevent abusive power disparities.
34
 
Arguably the most important state interest in marriage is the effect that 
marriage and divorce have on children and parental rights. “In virtually 
every comparison done to date, children in two-biological parent, marital 
homes (the ‘nuclear family’) fare better than other children, along almost 
every index.”35 The state has an interest in protecting the welfare of 
children. Since children do better within a two-parent family it follows 
that the state has an interest in encouraging marriage and regulating 
divorce.
36
 After a divorce the state must protect parental rights, and it has 
an interest in maximizing child welfare through a system ensuring 
 
 
 32. See Catherine T. Smith, Philosophical Models of Marriage and Their Influence on Property 
Division Methods at Divorce, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 214, 217–18 (2000) (explaining that in a 
divorce the state is responsible for dividing property equally and tasked with considering need 
disparities between couples). 
 33. Clare Chambers, The Marriage-Free State, 113 PROC. OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 123, 
125 (2013).  
 34. See id. at 133 (“[P]ersonal relationships still have to be regulated so as to protect vulnerable 
parties, including, but not only, children; so as to regulate disputes over such matters as joint property; 
and so as to appropriately direct state benefits and taxes.”). 
 35. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Does Marriage Make People Good or Do Good People Marry, 42 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 889 (2005) (citing Robin Fretwell Wilson, Evaluating Marriage: Does Marriage 
Matter to the Nurturing of Children?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 847, 851–52 (2005) (“[This research was 
based on studies] in two types of married and unmarried households: those in which the child is a 
biological child of both adults and those in which the child is the biological child of only one.”)). 
 36. See id. at 891 (“[T]here is something about marriage that confers advantages on children. 
Marriage itself makes people better parents.”).  
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visitation and child support. Child welfare is one of the primary interests 
used to justify state regulation of the marital institution.
37
 However, it is 
important to note that a marital relationship affects more state interests 
than just child welfare. It affects the state’s interests in property, taxation, 
and healthcare, and it accommodates for the differing benefits and 
sacrifices that people make when they build a life with one another. 
Without state involvement in the marital institution, marriage would 
simply be a contractual relationship and the state would be unable to 
address the above-mentioned needs. Purely contractual relationships are 
subject to power discrepancies and abuse between parties that the state has 
an interest in preventing. As mentioned above, marriage affects legitimate 
state interests that cannot be avoided by turning it into a purely contractual 
relationship.
38
 Additionally, people entering into marriage are not always 
sophisticated parties and do not typically plan for future disputes or 
potential divorce. Eliminating state regulation of marriage would prevent 
the state from effectively addressing these issues. 
Marital relationships existed before governments instituted legal 
recognition of them.
39
 Legal recognition of marriage simply allows the 
state to address interests that are affected by these relationships. However, 
legal recognition of a marital relationship conveys “recognition, dignity, 
and protection”40 within society. In Windsor, the Supreme Court 
acknowledged that legal recognition of marriage protects personhood and 
dignity.
41
 Nevertheless, it also stipulated that states have discretion in 
issuing this protection, and declined to acknowledge that the Constitution 
itself protects such personhood and dignity. Two years later, the Supreme 
Court in Obergefell held that same-sex marriage is a fundamental right 
that cannot be denied by states.
42
 The discrepancy between these decisions 
can be explained through a jurisprudential analysis. 
 
 
 37. See Gallagher, supra note 29, at 232–33. 
 38. See Chambers, supra note 33, at 133–34 (“Even if contracts are allowed, the state must set 
limits on contracts that would be unjust for the contracting parties . . . or for third parties such as 
children, and must provide guidance for disputes that arise between people in personal relationship 
who have not made a contract.”). 
 39. See Nichols, supra note 1, at 198 (“[T]he initial evolution of any external jurisdiction 
(whether civil or ecclesiastical) over marriage was itself an innovation, for matters of marriage ‘had 
been largely outside the sphere of law’ for many centuries.”). 
 40. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584, 2601–02 (2015) (“As the State itself makes marriage all the more precious by the 
significance it attaches to it, exclusion from that status has the effect of teaching that gays and lesbians 
are unequal in important resects.”). 
 41. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
 42. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05.  
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PERSONHOOD AND RIGHTS 
Although states have a responsibility to regulate certain interests that 
are affected by marriage, it does not necessarily follow that states ought to 
have the ability to distinguish which relationships deserve protection of 
personhood and dignity. In Loving, the court treated the freedom to marry 
as a vital personal right belonging equally to all people.
43
 In Windsor, the 
court declined to acknowledge an overall personal right to marriage, and 
instead emphasized the authority of the state to determine whose 
personhood and dignity are protected by marriage.
44
 The difference in how 
each court construed the government’s role varies by how each court 
analyzed the connection between positive and negative rights. The Loving 
court acknowledged that personhood corresponds with certain rights that 
government must affirmatively protect from state infringement. The 
rational in Windsor was more in line with the position that the 
government’s function is to acknowledge and protect certain societal 
institutions, which in turn protect personhood. This political and 
philosophical debate is centered on the contrasting philosophies articulated 
by Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.  
A. Immanuel Kant 
“Modern philosophy can hardly ignore Kant; it either derives from him 
or must deal with him.”45 His political theory, although fundamentally 
unique, falls within the category of natural law theories similar to 
Locke’s.46 It is my opinion that Kant’s philosophy aligns with the classical 
liberalism of the founding fathers and explains the belief that government 
is necessary to protect individual autonomy and personhood.
47
 Kant 
believed in a strong central government limited to laws and actions that 
could pass the test of the Categorical Imperative,
48
 which is essentially a 
duty to “[a]ct only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same 
 
 
 43. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 44. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2706. 
 45. Nathaniel Lawrence, Kant and Modern Philosophy, 10 REV. METAPHYSICS 441, 441 (1957). 
 46. See Daniel Weinstock, Natural Law and Public Reason in Kant’s Political Philosophy, 26 
CAN. J. PHIL. 389, 392 (1996) (explaining that Kant’s natural law argument is limited to the rational 
necessity for consent for a state that limits institutions and realizes individual autonomy). 
 47. See Steven Smith, What is “Right” in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right?, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
3, 15 (1989) (arguing the types of “unbridled individualism” embraced by Locke and Kant have 
virtually been accepted as a self-evident truth in the United States). 
 48. See Weinstock, supra note 46, at 395.  
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time, will that it should become a universal law.”49 “Kant’s requirement is 
that legislators ask themselves whether the policies they are proposing 
could be accepted by people, without their acceptance having the effect of 
subverting their autonomy.”50 Ultimately, the necessity of government and 
its ensuing limits are focused around ensuring inherent freedom. 
Today, “the prevailing idea of personhood draws much of its sense 
from the Kantian dichotomy of person and object.”51 According to Kant, 
people have “an ‘innate right to freedom,’ defined as ‘independence from 
being constrained by another’s choice.’”52 Within the state of nature, 
people acting with absolute free will inevitably intrude on the absolute free 
will of others. Therefore, a form of government is necessary to maximize 
individual rights of the subject by “apportioning and enforcing legal 
rights.”53 People consent to a form of government, therefore legitimizing it 
as a means of protecting autonomy and personhood. While the government 
can enact laws that are unpopular, it cannot make laws that contradict 
autonomy and free will. To a certain extent all laws limit free will, yet a 
law that contradicts autonomy and free will is one that fails the 
Categorical Imperative. “The examples Kant provides of laws 
incompatible with the contractualist criterion are ones in which law-
makers seize on conventional but morally arbitrary facts about certain 
classes of persons as sufficient grounds for differential treatment.”54 Under 
Kantian liberalism, the government cannot have the power or discretion 
“to give [one] class of persons the right to marry [and therefore confer] 
upon them a dignity and status of immense import”55 without conferring 
the same dignity, status, and rights universally. 
Within American society, the rights of personhood are tied to a concept 
of universal “inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness” because “all men are created equal.”56 I believe it is safe to say 
that the Fourteenth Amendment embraces Kantian Liberalism and the 
 
 
 49. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (James W. Ellington 
trans., 3d ed. 1993); see also id. at 402 (“As long as it is not self-contradictory to say that an entire 
people could agree to such a law, however painful it might seem, then the law is in harmony with 
right.”) (citing Immanuel Kant, Theory and Practice (1793), reprinted in KANT’S POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 79 (Hans Reiss ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., 1970)). 
 50. Weinstock, supra note 46, at 403. 
 51. Daniel Hoffman, Personhood and Rights, 19 POLITY 74, 85 (1986). 
 52. Weinstock, supra note 46, at 393 (citing Immanuel Kant, The Doctrine of Right (1797), 
reprinted in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 63 (Mary Gregor ed. and trans., 1991)). 
 53. Id. at 393.  
 54. Id. at 403. 
 55. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013). 
 56. Hoffman, supra note 51, at 77–78. 
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concept of personhood in stating, “nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”57 Kantian 
liberalism is also consistent with language in Obergefell protecting the 
personhood and fundamental rights of same-sex couples under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
58
 Kant believed that the function of government 
is to protect personhood rights; and while he believed that the Categorical 
Imperative only allows for sexual relationships within marriage, he did not 
address whether he believed in an inherent legal right to marriage 
protected by the Categorical Imperative.
59
 
Kant viewed marriage as a civil contract and defined it as “a union of 
two persons of different sexes for lifelong possession of each other’s 
sexual properties.”60 Hegel critiqued this definition of marriage and 
pointed out that Kant’s view of marriage treats people as objects.61 If 
marriage is simply a contractual obligation involving objects then it cannot 
be protected by the Categorical Imperative, which protects the rights of the 
subject to experience the object. Furthermore, the Categorical Imperative 
leads to an unconditional requirement that must be obeyed in all 
circumstances. Marriage is a choice, not an unconditional requirement and 
so it does not fall within the Categorical Imperative.
62
 It is my contention 
that Hegel’s arguments do not adequately construe Kant’s philosophy.  
Kant believed that sex requires people to allow themselves to be 
objectified and possessed by another. On the surface, this use of another as 
a means to an end is immoral. However, Kant believed the arbitrary power 
and dehumanization in sex could be constrained “by applying the principle 
of legal equality to certain rights in marital life.”63 He argued that within a 
just society marriage ought to entail legal equality conditioned on 
reciprocity of rights, and an impartiality that brackets out inequality and 
treats partners as contractually equal human agents.
64
 Therefore, marriage 
 
 
 57. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 58. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“Under the Constitution, same-sex 
couples seek in marriage the same legal treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their 
choices and diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”). 
 59. Anthony J. La Vopa, Thinking about Marriage: Kant’s Liberalism and the Peculiar Morality 
of Conjugal Union, 77 J. Mod. Hist. 1, 12 (2005). 
 60. Steven Miller & Sara Guyer, Literature and the Right to Marriage, DIACRITICS, Winter 
2005, at 3, 12. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See id. at 4 (“There is no categorical imperative to marry. Marriage has the paradoxical status 
of an elective obligation: an obligation that one chooses to assume (and, in principle, has the right to 
choose).”). 
 63. See La Vopa, supra note 59, at 25.  
 64. Id. at 25–26. 
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could be understood as “‘rights to persons akin to rights to things,’ with 
‘right’ here meaning ‘possession of an external object as a thing’ but ‘use 
of it as a person.’”65 While Kant believed that legal marriage resulted in 
contractual and metaphysical equality which made sex moral, he still 
believed that men were superior to women.
66
 “Like the wage earner in a 
free-market contract, the married woman had purely formal contractual 
rights—rights that might be meaningless in view of the structure of 
inequality in which the contract operated and that might in fact serve to 
obscure structural injustice.”67 
It is important to note that while Kant’s political philosophy protects 
against moral and arbitrary legislation, he himself condemned same-sex 
relationships as immoral. Kant perceived sexual relationships as 
repugnant, animalistic, and prone to abuse of power during vulnerability.
68
 
He made an exception for heterosexual marriage because it was an 
opportunity for unequal parties to become mutually dependent on one 
another in a way that complimented and completed them.
69
 “Hence it is 
not only admissible for the sexes to surrender and to accept each other for 
enjoyment under the condition of marriage, but it is possible for them to 
do so only under this condition.”70 Kant viewed sex as a mutual property 
exchange of one’s body, where partners acted as “contractually equal 
human agents” and therefore neither was subject to an abuse of power or 
loss of dignity.
71
 He argued that only sex within marriage was moral 
because partners did not sacrifice their dignity, and they could therefore be 
granted legal protection against one another.
72
 Kant believed that 
“[h]omosexuality dehumanized not simply by reducing the other to a thing 
but also by ‘degrading the self below the level of animals’ (which at least 
used sex to preserve the species).”73  
In spite of his personal views, Kant’s political philosophy guarding 
against arbitrary distinctions in the law presents a strong argument 
requiring legal recognition of same-sex marriage. His political philosophy 
must first be separated from his moral judgments regarding same-sex 
 
 
 65. Id. at 24 (citing Kant, supra note 49).  
 66. Id. at 27. 
 67. Id.  
 68. See La Vopa, supra note 59, at 25. 
 69. See id. at 20 (“Marriage, I contrast, was a relationship of mutual dependence in which each 
needed the other to approach ‘completion’ and in which inequality was the rule.”). 
 70. Id. at 24 (citing Immanuel Kant, Praktische Philosophie Herder, 27 PREUSSISCHE AKADEMIE 
DER WISSENSCHAFTEN 1, 62 (1974)). 
 71. Id. at 26. 
 72. Id. at 20. 
 73. Id. at 28. 
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relationships and marriage in general. One approach would be to point out 
Kant’s own belief that legislatures should not make laws based on morally 
arbitrary facts that set apart certain classes of people.
74
 However, 
advocates of same-sex marriage ought to also address Kant’s argument 
that only sexual relationships within heterosexual marriages contain 
dignity, and are therefore the only ones deserving of legal recognition. 
This entire premise is based on the assertion that humans sacrifice their 
dignity during sex, unless it falls within a heterosexual marriage. This 
assertion may have been accepted during Kant’s time, but it is not a 
generally accepted belief today. 
Kant believed that dignity is sacrificed during sex because people allow 
themselves to be dehumanized, objectified, and because they make 
themselves vulnerable and therefore subject to power discrepancies. He 
argued that marriage protects dignity and guards against power 
discrepancies through “a mutually voluntary (and exclusive) contractual 
relationship.”75 According to Kant, when both parties are given the right to 
objectify the other by acquiring property rights to the other then they 
retain their dignity and power. Since they retain their dignity, the law must 
recognize that they have rights, and it must protect those rights. Kant 
maintained that heterosexual sex was moral within the context of 
marriage, where the civil contract is guaranteed in law. Since same-sex 
couples are just as capable of forming civil contracts consisting of equality 
and reciprocity of rights, Kant’s rationale can be used to argue that a just 
legal system ought to recognize and protect that contract. 
There are those who argue that marriage is nothing more than an 
optional contract that should not be regulated by the state. If this were the 
case, then marriage would be equally available to everyone and would fit 
nicely within the Kantian political and ethical philosophy of liberalism. 
However, people marry for a variety of reasons, and limiting marriage to a 
contract over-simplifies that relationship.
76
 Regardless of who, why, or 
how people marry; their union has an affect on substantial state interests.
77
 
As a result, the state will continue to be involved in marriage, and the 
institution will continue to convey social status and economic benefits. As 
long as marriage continues to convey important benefits and recognition 
within the community, it confers upon people “a dignity and status of 
 
 
 74. See Weinstock, supra note 46. 
 75. La Vopa, supra note 59, at 31. 
 76. See Amato, supra note 4 (explaining that people marry for status within the institution, 
companionship and mutual support, or passion and individual growth).  
 77. See Chambers, supra note 33, at 133.  
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immense import.”78 Today, legal recognition of marriage actually conveys 
dignity upon relationships, which is the opposite of Kant’s premise that 
the law recognizes sexual relationships that are already comprised of 
dignity. 
Obergefell supports the position that the recognition of personhood and 
social dignity, conveyed by state acknowledgment of marriage, falls 
within the “inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” 
that must be equally recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment. As 
long as state action conveys dignity and rights within certain relationships, 
doing so arbitrarily among classes of people violates Kant’s Categorical 
Imperative. While marriage affects social interests, so long as it is between 
consenting individuals it is one of the few freedoms that does not intrude 
on the rights of others. Under Kantian liberalism there is no state interest 
in denying same-sex couples the right to marry, though there is a vital duty 
to prevent acknowledging arbitrary and differential treatment between 
classes.
79
 Failure to protect against such arbitrary differential treatment 
does not “take seriously the fact that there exist within such societies a 
plurality of reasonable conceptions of the good, and that the enterprise of 
justification must therefore prescind from basing itself on any one of them 
to the exclusion of the other.”80 The authors of the Constitution embraced 
Kantian liberalism when they formed a legal system emphasizing equally 
inherent freedom and rights. This liberalism rejects illegitimate 
paternalism, even if it means rejecting the overall moral will of the people 
in that time.
81
 Whatever Kant’s moral beliefs regarding marriage, as long 
as state action conveys dignity and rights it cannot discriminate based on 
arbitrary moral determinations.  
 
 
 78. Smith, supra note 47; see also Miller & Guyer, supra note 60, at 1 (quoting MICHAEL 
WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 81–148 (1999). “[I]n the modern era, marriage has become 
the central legitimating institution by which the state regulates and permeates people’s most intimate 
lives; it is a zone of privacy outside of which sex is unprotected. In this context, to speak of marriage is 
merely one choice among others is at best naïve.”). 
 79. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 80. Weinstock, supra note 46, at 401. 
 81. Id. at 407 (explaining that Kant’s hypothetical contractarian procedures avoids one 
generation unjustly binding others by entrenching their understandings into steadfast laws). 
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B. Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 
Although the U.S. legal system embraces basic Kantian liberalism and 
natural law principles as outlined above, the Supreme Court in Windsor 
incorporated some of Hegel’s positive rights theory. Hegel criticized 
natural law theorists for embracing a static concept of human rights fixed 
at human origin.
82
 Instead, he argued that human rights are “bound up with 
the dynamic structure of human history.”83 Instead of believing in natural 
arbitrary freedoms, Hegel believed that freedom is tied to mutual 
recognition within societal institutions. To Hegel, rational liberty is moral 
freedom, which contains “the capacity not just to desire but also to reflect 
evaluatively upon the kinds of things we ought to desire.”84 The law 
“purges the state of caprice and makes possible such modern freedoms as 
contract, property, career choice, religion, and speech.”85 It is within the 
social institutions enabled by law that a person truly has free will because 
it causes people to recognize and respect the ways of others. Hegel 
believed that it is only possible for a person to know himself and his own 
will through interaction with others, and that the ultimate human desire is 
to be recognized by others.
86
 He embraced the human capacity to desire 
more than natural objects and the ability “to stand back from our desires 
and ask whether they are the kinds of desires we wish to have.”87 One of 
these desires is to be recognized and respected by others.  
While Kant embraced the rights of the natural individual will, Hegel 
argued that “[t]he practices and institutions of ethical life—family life, 
economic activity, and politics—are not just limitations on the will’s 
activity but the social context within which freedom is possible.”88 
Although Hegel believed that individuals ought to be treated as equally 
free under the law, he believed that this legal recognition is earned by 
“overcoming the natural state of his self-consciousness and obeying a 
universal,” which is the law.89 Essentially, Hegel argued that laws make 
societal institutions possible, which in turn allow people to be self-
conscious of others and their will to be recognized. Hegel believed that it 
is by “conforming” ones desires to fit within moral, ethical, and political 
 
 
 82. See Smith, supra note 47, at 4. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 7. 
 85. Id. at 8. 
 86. Id. at 9. 
 87. Id. at 10. 
 88. See Smith, supra note 47, at 11–12. 
 89. Id. at 13.  
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institutions that one earns recognition and therefore free will under the 
law. Kant believed government should function as a safeguard against 
moral paternalism, while Hegel believed that government should promote 
morality.
90
  
The Windsor Court declined to acknowledge an inherent right to 
marriage, and instead emphasized the power of the state to define the 
marital institution and determine who has a right to the dignity and 
privileges of marriage. The decision to protect the state’s power to define 
the marital institution, above any inherent human right to marriage, fits 
within Hegel’s political and ethical philosophy. However, a closer look at 
Hegel’s concept of marriage can also be used to support recognizing same-
sex marriage. “Hegel describes the marital vow as a ‘festive declaration of 
consent to the ethical bond of marriage.’”91 In describing marriage, Hegel 
explained that “[t]he sensuous moment which pertain[s] to natural life is 
thereby put in its ethical context as an accidental consequence belonging 
to the external existence of the ethical bond, which may even consist 
exclusively in mutual love and support.”92 Therefore, the ethical bond of 
the marital institution is the vow or consent (mutual recognition) that 
embraces mutual love and support. It is neither a contract nor the attraction 
and desire experienced in the state of nature, because those fall beyond the 
higher ethical bond. Hegel emphasized the importance of the “festive” 
declaration because it extends recognition beyond just the couple but to 
the family, community, and state.
93
 
Hegel’s basic definition of marriage states: “Marriage should therefore 
be defined more precisely as rightfully ethical love, so that the transient, 
capricious, and purely subjective aspects of love are excluded from it.”94 
His concept of an ethical life and “the right” is the process of rising above 
the state of nature and beyond our biological urges to a place of shared 
ideas, norms, values, and the recognition and respect for others that is 
embraced by institutions such as marriage. Like any philosopher, Hegel 
was a product of his time, and he believed that marriage is the union of 
 
 
 90. See id. at 14 (“What [Smith] called Hegel’s positive defense of right is indicated in his 
decision to treat politics as a branch of ethics.”). 
 91. Miller & Guyer, supra note 60, at 6. 
 92. Id. at 5 (citing G.W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 204 (Allen W. 
Wood ed., H. B. Nisbit trans. 1991)).  
 93. Id. at 7. 
 94. Id. at 10 (citing G.W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 201 (Allen W. 
Wood ed., H. B. Nisbit trans., 1991)); see also id. at 12 (explaining that marriage celebrates and 
upholds a relationship where partners have impersonal desires and do not become objects or engage in 
a Kantian contractual property exchange). 
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one man and one woman. However, it is my belief that his philosophy may 
be used as a proponent for same-sex marriage.  
Hegel was not concerned with the physical aspect of marriage. Instead 
he explained the institution of marriage as the recognition of rightfully 
ethical love and support, where the couple mutually recognizes each other 
and is recognized by society. Furthermore, Hegel believed that rights are 
tied to human history and “a worldwide struggle aimed at the realization 
of a certain desirable goal, namely, freedom.”95 If rights are not fixed but 
change with the historical struggle for freedom, the argument must be 
made that the state ought to recognize that same-sex couples are equally 
capable of mutual love and support. After all, it is only by allowing same-
sex couples to take part in societal institutions such as marriage that they 
will be able to experience recognition and free will under a Hegelian 
philosophy. While the state may restrict access to the marital institution to 
maintain morality within the institution, Hegel’s conception of marriage 
actually supports an argument that it ought to be made available to all of 
those capable of mutual love and support. 
IV. FREEDOM OF MARRIAGE INVOLVES CORRELATING NEGATIVE AND 
POSITIVE RIGHTS 
Kantian liberalism emphasizes natural freedom and places a duty on 
government not to legislate morality. Although Kant supported an 
authoritative government, his duties and limitations on government convey 
significant personal rights. In contrast, Hegel emphasized the importance 
of institutions and the “right” for people to be able to act and be 
recognized through participating in those institutions. However, he did not 
follow this up by placing duties on the community, government, or 
institution that prevent them from limiting access to the very societal 
institutions that he believed enable freedom. Kant emphasized the 
importance of negative rights, while Hegel emphasized the importance of 
positive rights. Both theories have had an impact on American 
jurisprudence and interpreting Constitutional rights.
96
 It is my belief that 
the influence of these contrasting theories helps to explain the contrasting 
outcomes in Loving and Windsor. Below I argue that negative and positive 
 
 
 95. Smith, supra note 47, at 4. 
 96. See ROBERT M. MAURO, HEGEL’S INFLUENCE ON AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT: AN 
ANALYSIS OF THE AMERICAN PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT 3–4 (2000) (providing an overview of the 
belief that contemporary American liberalism draws upon Kant and that modern American liberalism 
is a result of the progressive movement influenced by Hegel). 
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rights are not distinct, but instead correlate. I explain how they correlate in 
the context of government regulation of the marital institution, and how 
that analysis is relevant in the Obergefell decision. 
The Constitution is often understood as conveying predominately 
negative rights and not positive rights.
97
 Negative rights theorists believe 
that constitutional rights protect citizens from overreaching government 
action, yet place no duty on the government to protect against non-
government action. Therefore, the Constitution protects from the 
government but does not necessarily entail protection by the government.
98
 
Under a strict negative rights interpretation, the Constitution constrains the 
government and does not necessarily give it the power to act in order to 
protect citizens from third-party constraints on freedom. While some 
theorists argue that the Constitution also contains positive rights, positive 
rights have generally been recognized under the power of the states not the 
federal government.
99
 This division of positive and negative rights is 
consistent with prior court opinions granting states the discretion to 
determine whether or not to protect a same-sex right to marriage. Prior to 
recognition of a fundamental constitutional right to marriage in 
Obergefell, individual states had the decision of whether to affirmatively 
protect such a right.
100
 This structure essentially treated marriage as a 
positive right. 
In Loving, the Supreme Court had already recognized that there was a 
fundamental right to marriage. However, Loving was a case involving a 
heterosexual couple during a time when same-sex marriage was not at 
issue. The question in Obergefell, was whether the Constitution also 
protects a same-sex couple’s right to marriage. As explained above, there 
is a strong argument under a Kantian negative rights theory that the 
government must not arbitrarily legislate or place constraints on a same-
sex couple’s “right” to marry.101 However, it does not necessarily follow 
that the federal government has a duty to actively protect same-sex 
marriage as a fundamental right against constraints by individual states. 
Under a strict negative rights theory, the federal government does not have 
a duty to affirmatively protect a right to same-sex marriage unless it is 
 
 
 97. See Lawrence Friedman, Rights in Front of Our Eyes: Positive Rights and The American 
Constitutional Tradition, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 609, 610 (2014) (“The Bill of Rights, after all, reflects an 
effort aimed at constraining government, primarily by prohibiting its interference with basic individual 
liberties like the freedom to speak and express oneself.”). 
 98. See id. at 614. 
 99. See id. at 611. 
 100. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 411 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 101. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
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acknowledged as a fundamental constitutional right. Therefore, 
Obergefell’s acknowledgement of same-sex marriage as a fundamental 
constitutional right ensures active protection by the federal government. 
The Supreme Court had already acknowledged a fundamental positive 
right to marriage in Loving, and withholding that right from same-sex 
couples based on arbitrary moral distinctions would have been inconsistent 
with Kantian liberalism. Since the act of same-sex marriage does not 
infringe upon the rights or freedoms of other parties, the federal 
government should ensure that couples are free to marry.
102
 After Windsor, 
it was not clear whether same-sex marriage was a negative or positive 
right. The federal government was prohibited from placing constraints on 
any acknowledged same-sex right to marriage—effectively treating it as a 
negative right. However, this right only legally existed if an individual 
state chose to acknowledge the dignity and personhood of a same-sex 
couple’s relationship. Obergefell’s acknowledgement of a fundamental 
right to same-sex marriage resolved this confusion, making it both a 
positive and negative right. 
Kant believed that individuals have a right to internal and external 
freedom, and that this freedom involved correlating negative and positive 
rights. Theoretically, people accept rule of law because it maximizes 
overall freedom by uniformly placing a duty on everyone not to violate the 
rights of others.
103
 This duty results in a negative freedom, which is 
“independence from another’s necessitating choice.”104 Kant believed that 
the correlating positive right was dependence on the juridical state, and the 
ability to be a part of it.
105
 According to Kant, the positive right that 
correlates with external freedom is the right to choose the juridical state 
over the state of nature.
106
 This correlative analysis fails to address the fact 
that in a juridical state where there is “independence from another’s 
necessitating choice,” there is a resulting opportunity to make one’s own 
choices. Therefore, the correlating positive right under Kantian Liberalism 
 
 
 102. See Michael A. Payne, Philosophical Perspectives on the Constitution, 12 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 341–45 (1987) (“The individual is free to do whatever he wants, but only if the basic moral rights 
of others are not violated.”). 
 103. See SHARON BYRD AND JOACHIM HRUSHCKA, KANT’S DOCTRINE OF RIGHT: A 
COMMENTARY 88–89 (2010); see also Weinstock, supra note 46, at 394 (“[M]y claim to freedom, 
since it is grounded on a capacity I share with all other persons, must be bounded in a way that 
recognizes the like claim to freedom of all others.”). 
 104. See id. at 92. 
 105. See id. at 92–93. 
 106. See id. at 93 (“Kant’s formulation of the postulate of public law reflects the positive aspect of 
external freedom . . . . ‘In a situation of unavoidable contact with all others, you should leave this state 
[the state of nature] and move to a juridical state!’”). 
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is not just the right to choose to be a part of the juridical state, it is the 
freedom of independent choice and action. However, this correlating 
freedom only means something if the government protects it in addition to 
refraining from infringing upon it. Although Kant did not address 
correlating state protection, there are subsequent liberalists who believe in 
certain innate natural rights and argue that the state has a duty to protect 
those freedoms. These liberalists have built on this concept of the freedom 
to be left alone and emphasize a correlating freedom of action and 
expression.
107
 
A right that requires legislative acknowledgement and action is 
commonly viewed as a positive right. The rights to education or healthcare 
are common positive rights that require legislative acknowledgement and, 
subsequently, legislative action. For people to effectively have these 
rights, states create institutions and act in ways ensuring access to each 
right. Although marriage is an institution that requires state regulation and 
authorization, it is different than typical positive rights such as education 
or healthcare. Unlike education or healthcare, the institution of marriage 
does not require state involvement to make relationships accessible or 
maintainable. Instead, state regulation of marriage is necessary to address 
the effects of marital relationships on state interests. Marital relationships 
are attainable whether or not states provide access, and the permissive 
function of state regulation of marriage actually limits access to the 
institution. This is very different from the state’s objective of expanding 
access to educational and healthcare institutions. 
Under a positive rights theory, states have the authority to regulate 
institutions because such regulation is necessary to preserve and provide 
access to those institutions. Adherents of Hegelian thought believe that 
with positive freedom “the agent in whose freedom they are interested is 
identified as the ‘real’ or the ‘rational’ or the ‘moral’ person who is 
somehow sometimes hidden within.”108 As explained above, Hegel 
believed that true freedom could only occur when the “rational person” 
within the human body could partake in societal institutions and thus 
realize his rational or moral self. This allows the person “to see the surge 
of impulse or passion as an obstacle to the attainment of what [he] ‘really 
wants.’”109 Therefore, only by having access to societal associations does a 
person have the ability to truly identify himself, embrace autonomy, and 
become truly free. Simply put, state action is necessary to create and 
 
 
 107. See Gerald MacCallum, Negative and Positive Freedom, 76.3 PHIL. REV. 312, 323 (1967). 
 108. Id. at 324. 
 109. Id.  
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maintain social institutions so that citizens may utilize them and become 
free. 
Kant and Hegel have different conceptions of freedom and human 
rights. Their approach to analytical jurisprudence is responsible for much 
of the divide in political theory, and is reflected in the contrasting Supreme 
Court rulings in Loving and Windsor. However, not all jurisprudential 
theorists believe there has to be a distinction between the negative and 
positive interpretations of freedom. Gerald MacCullum Jr. argued that the 
distinction between the two types of thought is not in their concept of 
freedom, but instead in their concept of the “person.”110 Both Kant and 
Hegel emphasized the importance of protecting the freedom and rights of 
autonomy. The distinction is that Kant believed an individual has inherent 
autonomy as a natural person, while Hegel believed that autonomy is only 
realized through participation in societal institutions that reveal the “real” 
person within the human body.
111
  
In both Loving and Windsor, the Supreme Court referenced a 
personhood right in marriage.
112
 The difference between the two is that 
Loving treated a personhood right as deserving inherent freedom from 
government restraint while in Windsor, the Court acknowledged a 
connection between personhood and marriage yet emphasized the state’s 
discretion in granting access to this personhood right. In each case the 
freedom the Court considered was the same: the freedom to marry. The 
difference is in where they determined personhood rights originate; the 
former treated personhood rights as inherent while the latter decided that 
the state determines to whom to grant personhood rights.
113
 This 
contradictory treatment of personal rights and freedom is rooted in a futile 
distinction between different kinds of freedom or rights.  
MacCullum believed that instead of distinguishing between negative 
and positive conceptions of freedom, freedom ought to be understood as a 
 
 
 110. See id. at 325 (“Only by insisting at least provisionally that all the writers have the same 
concept of freedom can one see clearly and keep sharply focused the obvious and extremely important 
differences among them concerning the concept of ‘person.’”). 
 111. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been 
recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
men.”); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“[N]o legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage 
laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”).  
 113. See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2710 (Scalia J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court will next be 
“appalled by state legislatures; irrational and hateful failure to acknowledge that ‘personhood and 
dignity’ in the first place.”). 
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triadic relation between different variables.
114
 The triadic relation 
acknowledges that “freedom is thus always of something (an agent or 
agents), from something, to do, not do, become, or not become 
something.”115 This analysis enables consideration of the fact that the state 
has other legitimate interests aside from protecting freedom, and that some 
barriers may potentially outweigh certain freedoms. A triadic relation for 
the freedom of same-sex marriage considers: The freedom of an individual 
weighed against conflicting state interests to marry a person of the same 
gender. Ultimately the analysis is prone to discrepancies because it 
depends on how heavily each variable is weighed. However, it at least 
provides a means of simultaneously weighing the importance of the 
freedom, the severity of an intrusion, and any competing government 
interests. The triadic relation is a means of acknowledging that there are 
government interests in protecting both negative or positive rights, and 
that these interests correlate. 
Consider the example of state involvement in the institution of 
marriage. Under a negative rights theory, the government must 
acknowledge personhood rights and protect a person’s innate right to be 
free from government constraints on that right.
116
 A strict negative rights 
theorist would limit the government’s duty to refrain from imposing on a 
right, yet would not require the government to protect the same right from 
constraint by third parties. When marriage is acknowledged as a negative 
right, individuals are effectively given the freedom to act on their personal 
right of marriage without government constraint. Of course, freedom from 
constraint only lasts as long as an individual’s free acts are not also 
constrained by third parties.
117
 Therefore, negative rights provide freedom, 
yet those freedoms do not mean much without correlating “rights to 
protection by, and not merely from, government.”118 Although people 
disagree with whether marriage should be available to same-sex couples, it 
is not generally argued that allowing them the freedom to marry would 
somehow constrain the rights of others.
119
 Under a negative rights theory, 
acknowledging a personal right to marriage places a duty on government 
 
 
 114. See MacCallum, supra note 107, at 312. 
 115. Id. at 314. 
 116. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 117. See Byrd & Hrushcka, supra note 103. 
 118. Friedman, supra note 97, at 614. 
 119. There are arguments that children have a right to well-being and that this requires the 
preservation of the institution of marriage. However, it is my opinion that this argument does not 
directly show how the freedom of same-sex marriage would constrain the rights of children. 
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to protect this right from unnecessary constraints by government as in 
Loving. 
Government protection from unnecessary constraints on personal rights 
is not the end of the story. Once this happens people have the freedom to 
marry and marriage soon becomes a societal custom. The institution of 
marriage is now part of the bedrock of society, and as explained above, 
has an impact on other government interests.
120
 This requires a positive 
rights consideration of the importance of state involvement in societal 
institutions. Some social institutions are created by the state as part of its 
community caretaking function. The education and healthcare systems are 
both examples of this. In contrast, sometimes the community forms other 
social institutions, such as marriage, and the state must address how those 
institutions affect legitimate state interests. According to the positive 
rights analysis, the government has an interest in maintaining these 
societal institutions because participation provides a person with the 
freedom of self-recognition and an opportunity to discover their own 
will.
121
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor to recognize a state’s 
authority to regulate the marital institution reflects its acceptance of a 
positive rights theory. However, that position focused solely on the state’s 
interest in maintaining the institution of marriage and neglected to 
consider the state’s duty to protect personal freedom from unnecessary 
constraint. As Gerald MacCullum explained:  
In recognizing that freedom is always both freedom from something 
and freedom to do or become something, one is provided with a 
means of making sense out of interminable and poorly defined 
controversies concerning, for example, when a person really is free, 
why freedom is important, and on what its importance depends.
122
 
The freedom to marry affects state interests, and the Windsor Court was 
correct to acknowledge that the state has an interest in governing aspects 
of the marital institution. The Court acknowledged that when the state 
permits same-sex marriage it protects personhood and dignity,
123
 yet it 
failed to address whether the federal government had a duty to protect 
against constraints on that personhood and dignity. It was not until 
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Obergefell, that the Court acknowledged that the freedom to marry also 
entails a freedom from unnecessary government constraint. 
Although an analysis of the triadic relation depends on the weight 
placed on each variable, such an analysis at least requires that each 
variable be considered. The freedom to marry may conflict with 
governmental interests, and it entails a correlating freedom from certain 
barriers. This requires one to consider and weigh any conflicting 
government interests, and the barriers preventing the freedom of marriage. 
There are many scholarly articles addressing whether the government has 
legitimate conflicting interests with the freedom to marry. The necessary 
follow-up question that many of them fail to address is whether any of 
those conflicting interests are enough to justify a state’s decision to enact 
barriers that obstruct the freedom to marry. This analysis is similar to the 
rational basis review that courts use in determining whether there is a 
rational basis for state laws that conflict with personal rights.
124
 
Since marriage is a social institution originating in the community and 
not the state, the state’s interests and involvement ought to be more limited 
than its interests in an institution such as education or healthcare. 
Furthermore, the state primarily has an interest in marriage because of the 
effect that it has on property, taxes, child welfare, inheritance, etc. 
Therefore, any barriers the state places on marriage ought to be tied to 
those legitimate government interests. When the state enacts barriers that 
obstruct the freedom to marry, it must have a legitimate interest that 
outweighs the duty of government to protect against such constraints. The 
primary motivation for barriers to same-sex marriage are not directly tied 
to state interests such as property or child welfare. Instead, objections to 
same-sex marriage are rooted in beliefs within society that same-sex 
marriage is immoral or that marriage only applies to relationships that 
have the potential for procreation.
125
 Proponents of this argument ignore 
the fact that infertile couples are allowed to marry and that society needs 
adoption just as much as procreation. 
The fundamental point of Kant’s Categorical Imperative was that the 
government must only make and enforce laws that apply to everyone 
universally and that those laws ought to maximize freedom of action.
126
 
Kant saw a propensity of the majority to legislate morality in a way that 
 
 
 124. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395–96 (1978) (Justice Stewart, concurring) (arguing 
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creates laws that treat classes of people differently.
127
 Under a negative 
rights theory, the government has a duty to protect from these very 
constraints on personal rights. Under a positive rights theory, it is possible 
for the government to legislate morality in a way that requires conformity 
in order to participate in social institutions. However, a fundamental 
aspect of a positive rights theory is that the state is necessary because it 
provides people with access to social institutions. Furthermore, a Hegelian 
conception of marriage would not base a moral conception on the physical 
aspect of a couple’s relationship. It follows that states ought to have a 
strong, legitimate reason to deny a person’s ability to participate in the 
institution of marriage.  
Under a comprehensive analysis of freedom weighing both negative 
and positive rights, the government’s duty to protect against constraints on 
individual rights is not outweighed by any legitimate government interest 
in denying marriage to same-sex couples. Regardless of whether same-sex 
marriage is a fundamental constitutional right, both federal and state 
governments have a responsibility to refrain from unnecessarily imposing 
on freedom of action. Same-sex marriage is a commitment between two 
people that does not affect the freedom or rights of third parties. Therefore, 
the proffered government interest in constraining the freedom to marry 
does not outweigh the government’s duty to prohibit constraints on 
freedom.  
Prior to Obergefell, the federal government did not place constraints on 
the marital institution, nor did it affirmatively protect a right to same-sex 
marriage. Instead, the legal system simply allowed states to either 
maintain or broaden their pre-existing definition of marriage. This is 
reflected in the Windsor decision, which upheld the power of individual 
states to define marriage, and declined to provide federal protection for 
same-sex couples in states where marriage was limited to heterosexual 
couples. That system was consistent with a strict negative rights position, 
which contends that the government does not have a duty to protect 
against constraints on freedom not brought about by specific affirmative 
government action.  
In Windsor, unlike Loving, the Supreme Court declined to first 
acknowledge a negative right to marriage, and instead treated it as a 
positive right to be administered and restricted by the state.
128
 The first 
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problem with this approach is that the state’s duty under a positive rights 
theory has always been to provide access to institutions in order to 
maximize freedom. However, the most severe issue is a failure to 
acknowledge that freedom requires correlating positive and negative rights 
that must be considered together. A positive right requiring affirmative 
state action quickly turns useless if that right is not guarded from 
excessive state action. Similarly, a negative right against constraints by 
government is useless if the government does not also protect that same 
right. Freedom is an empty promise once the government adopts a 
jurisprudence that enables it to actively delegate personhood and dignity to 
some while simultaneously refusing to protect that same personhood and 
dignity in others.  
In Obergefell, the Supreme Court finally analyzed the correlating 
positive and negative rights associated with the freedom of marriage. 
Justice Kennedy began the opinion by stating: “The Constitution promises 
liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights 
that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their 
identity.”129 From the beginning, the opinion acknowledged that the 
Constitution protects rights tied to personhood, and that protection of these 
rights ensures the liberty to act and express oneself.
130
 It explained that 
state definitions of marriage which exclude same-sex couples are 
“demeaning,” “diminish their personhood,” and infringe on a correlating 
liberty to act.
131
  
The Court upheld a fundamental right to same-sex marriage under both 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. While the Due Process Clause protects against government 
oppression, the Equal Protection Clause simultaneously requires the 
government to protect against third-party oppression. “This interrelation of 
the two principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must 
become.”132 “Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal 
protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, 
yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach 
of the other.”133 Obergefell instituted a triadic concept of freedom: 
 
 
 129. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).  
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freedom of both heterosexual and homosexual couples, from state and 
federal government restraint, to become legally recognized members of the 
marital institution.
134
 
CONCLUSION 
Forty-eight years ago the United States Supreme Court recognized 
marriage as a fundamental right, and explained that legal recognition of 
marriage acknowledges personhood and conveys dignity and social status 
within society. Nevertheless, the Court in Windsor refused to acknowledge 
a fundamental Constitutional right to same-sex marriage, and emphasized 
that each state had the power to determine whose relationships deserve 
protection of personhood and dignity. The holding in Windsor was based 
on an understanding that states are the proper branch to define and regulate 
marriage, and was likely based on the belief that this Country’s 
“inalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” provide 
protection from government infringement but are not necessarily a 
guarantee of protection by government.
135
 The Windsor decision was a 
product of the historical tug-of-war between positive and negative rights 
theories, and a failure to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the 
correlation between so called positive and negative rights. It was not until 
the recent Supreme Court decision in Obergefell that same-sex couples 
were guaranteed this fundamental right through protection by the federal 
government. The contrast in Supreme Court precedent can be 
distinguished through an understanding of the jurisprudential rights 
analysis underlying each decision. An understanding of the correlative 
rights analysis underlying the Obergefell decision supports the position 
that it ensures optimal freedom by balancing both positive and negative 
rights. 
While the state has a legitimate interest in the marital institution, this 
interest ought to be limited to regulation specifically addressing how 
marriage affects government interests. The state should be limited in 
governing who may have access to the institution of marriage, and it 
should not obstruct the right to marry when doing so does not affect those 
legitimate government interests. The legal system within the United States 
is highly influenced by classic liberalism, which embraces a negative 
rights concept that places a duty on government to protect against 
constraints on individual freedom. A positive rights theorist could justify 
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legislation that constrains an individual’s ability to act, if used to maintain 
morality within social institutions. However, constraining a same-sex 
couple’s access to the marital institution is inconsistent with the 
underlying philosophy of Hegel’s positive rights theory. 
A comprehensive analysis of freedom and personhood rights should 
not be limited solely to negative or positive rights theories and should 
instead weigh considerations of both. Under a correlative analysis, the 
federal government has a duty to protect against constraints on same-sex 
couples’ personhood rights to marriage. That duty is both a duty to refrain 
from placing constraints on this freedom, and a correlating duty to protect 
that same freedom from state constraints. Equal protection of the freedom 
of marriage is not outweighed by legitimate government interests, and is in 
fact strengthened by the state’s responsibility in promoting access to social 
institutions. A comprehensive analysis balancing both negative and 
positive rights acknowledges that the personhood rights that constrain 
government action must also be protected. Within today’s social and legal 
system, marriage is a personhood right that conveys dignity and the 
opportunity to recognize a spouse and be recognized by the community. 
The right to marriage is a freedom tied to one’s personhood, a right that 
enables one to partake in society and find fulfillment, and an act that does 
not infringe on the freedom of others but that others all too often seek to 
infringe upon. This is the very type of freedom that both positive and 
negative rights theorists sought to protect with their analytical 
jurisprudence, and it was achieved through a correlating rights analysis in 
Obergefell. 
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